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ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
PARENTHOOD: TRADITIONAL FOUNDATIONS AND MODERN
APPLICATIONS FOR LESBIAN MOTHERS
WILLIAM M. LOPEZ
Charlie and Isabel are married. Two years into the marriage, they de-
cide that they want to have children. But unlike many married couples,
Charlie cannot get Isabel pregnant, so they decide to use artificial insemi-
nation. They find a reputable clinic and make an appointmentfor a consul-
tation the next week. After the consultation, the donor selection, and
several follow-up visits, the pregnancy test finally shows a pink plus sign.
Following months of morning sickness, crib-shopping, Lamaze classes,
Hdagen-Dazs chocolate chip, and countless hours scanning over baby-
name books, the day finally comes for Isabel to give birth. Joy and excite-
ment fill the hospital room as a perfect little girl is born. However, another
emotion makes its way into the delivery room that day too: confusion. The
hospital will not name Charlie on the birth certificate as the legal parent.
For some reason, the hospital is saying that it will only put the name of the
biological father on the certificate, even though Charlie has been a vital
part of the entire process and Charlie and Isabel have been married for
three years now. A few thousand tears, hours, and dollars later, Charlie is
able to secure a second parent adoption and finally becomes the little girl's
legal parent. Now, most people would agree that such a year of uncertain-
ty, anxiety, and heartache should have never occurred-but should it mat-
ter that Charlie is a woman?
INTRODUCTION
Unfortunately, many state legislatures and courts do think it matters
that Charlie is a woman. Although she is married to the mother of the child
and has actively participated in the decision to have a baby, she cannot be
considered a legal parent without a second parent adoption. In April of
2009, the Iowa Supreme Court gave the Midwest its first taste of marriage
equality by ruling in Varnum v. Brien that denying same-sex couples the
* J.D. Candidate, May, 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A., 2008, University of Miami.
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right to marry violated the Iowa State Constitution.1 But, just as many ex-
pected, this newly recognized right became the subject of both political and
legal attack, with critics trying to chip away at the broad and inclusive
rights that the Varnum decision granted to same-sex couples. Unfortunate-
ly, one particular attack on the right to marry came from the Iowa Attorney
General, Tom Miller, who claimed that the Varnum decision did not afford
the presumption of parenthood to legal same-sex spouses. 2 This presump-
tion, which has long been described as being "one of the strongest known
to law,"3 automatically confers parental status upon the spouse of the
child's natural mother if the mother is married to her spouse at the time the
child is born. 4 While most of the presumption of parenthood statutes are
written with opposite-sex married couples in mind, which is noted by the
opposite-sex gender-specific language used in those statutes,5 this fact may
not necessarily limit their application to newly legalized same-sex married
couples, especially when the underlying rationales for the presumption are
applied to same-sex parents. 6 Since the state legislatures have not updated
the presumption statutes to specifically include newly recognized same-sex
married couples, the question of whether this presumption applies to same-
sex couples is still a viable legal query.
Part I of this Note recounts the history of the presumption of parent-
hood, focusing on the traditional rationales of the presumption by going
through the meandering path of court decisions and state statutes in order to
uncover the reasons the common law created this legal fiction. Part II dis-
cusses the artificial insemination statutes that presume parentage to the
non-biological spouse simply by nature of the couples' marital status. After
showing that biological ties have little to do with the presumption, at least
with respect to children conceived through artificial insemination, the anal-
1. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
2. Don't Make Gay Spouses Adopt Their Own Children, BLEEDING HEARTLAND (Jul. 5, 2009,
11:30:31 AM CDT), http://www.bleedingheartland.com/diary/2866/dont-make-gay-spouses-adopt-
their-own-children/. This is not the original article. The original has been removed.
3. E.g., R.N. v. J.M. 61 S.W.3d 149, 155 (Ark. 2001); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 360 (Colo.
2000); In re Russell's Estate, 110 S.E. 791, 793 (S.C. 1922); In re Jones' Estate, 8 A.2d 631, 635 (Vt.
1939); Pierson v. Pierson, 214 P. 159, 159 (Wash. 1923).
4. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-20 (2010); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.822 (LexisNexis 2009); see
also Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the
Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 233 (2006).
5. For example, the Illinois Parentage Act states that "A man is presumed to be the natural father
of a child if (1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other, even though
the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born or conceived during such marriage."
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5 (LexisNexis 2009).
6. See Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (applying the California presumption of
parenthood statute, which was written in gender-specific terms, to make the biological mother's lesbian
partner the child's presumed mother).
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ysis will continue with an argument in support of preserving a lesbian
spouse's right to be considered the presumed parent of her spouse's biolog-
ical child. This will be done by examining the language and purposes of
artificial insemination statutes and by showing that the best interest of the
child is achieved by being born into a two-parent family, whatever the sex
or sexual orientation of the parents may be. The research used to support
the child welfare analysis is part of the same social science research used
by the petitioners who won marriage equality in lowa.7
I. TRACING THE (SOMETIMES COMPETING) HISTORIES OF THE
PRESUMPTION OF PARENTHOOD: FROM BASTARD LAWS TO ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION
There is no solitary historical rationale for the creation of the pre-
sumption of parenthood, which is presumably why "authorities disagree
about the purpose of the presumption, with some emphasizing its role in
promoting child welfare, others focusing on its protection of the public
purse, and still others criticizing it as a means of imposing patriarchal and
racist norms or protecting husbands' vanity." 8 This quagmire of historical
reasoning might seem problematic for someone who is trying to uncover
the true foundation of the presumption, but as Professor Susan Appleton
suggests, even if someone could theoretically find the original reason for
the presumption, such a finding would not necessarily change the discus-
sion.9 This Note is not attempting to find the one and only justification for
the presumption of parenthood, if such a justification even exists, but it is
rather searching for any sound reasons that might support the application of
the presumption to same-sex married couples today.' 0 The purpose of this
preliminary historical journey is to put the presumption in context and
therefore set the groundwork for illustrating how the traditional reasons for
the creation and preservation of the presumption of parenthood should-
and do-apply to women having children with women.
A. Child Welfare
The first, and most logical, rationale underlying the creation of the
presumption of parenthood is child welfare. Before there were laws protect-
7. This social science research was generously made available by the Midwest Regional Office
of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund.
8. Appleton, supra note 4, at 237.
9. Id at 242.
10. See id.
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ing children born out of wedlock, there were laws punishing the parents of
the resulting "filius nillius" (child of no one)" for their immoral beha-
vior.12 In both English and American common law, a child whose parents
were not married was considered illegitimate and was subject to severe
repercussions for his parents' indiscretions.13 The illegitimate, or "bastard,"
child had limited rights with respect to both parents and society in general;
these were ultimately codified in "Bastardy Laws."' 4 For example, in the
early common law, the child born out of wedlock was not even given the
right to demand support from his parents or the right to inherit from his
deceased parents.' 5 Some states eventually allowed the illegitimate child to
inherit from his mother's side of the family.16 Several scholars recognize
that the reason for these harsh legal outcomes was to punish parents for
acting immorally. Professor Laurence Nolan suggests that "the most signif-
icant policy reasons given for treating the illegitimate child so harshly were
to promote morality and marriage, to discourage promiscuity, to protect the
marital family unit, and to punish the immorality of the parents."' 7 Based
on English legal canon,
[i]t was in the interest of morals that the children born of a valid mar-
riage should have privileges denied children born of illicit unions. Par-
ents were to be punished in their children's disabilities more effectively
than in themselves.18
It was by stigmatizing these illicit children with the hardships of bas-
tardy that the immoral acts of their parents were thought best punished
because the law not only burdened the parent-child relationship with
shame, but also tried to create an endless sense of regret for the sinful inter-
course.
I1. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 447 (1765).
12. Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children" and Their Parents Before the United States Supreme
Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L.
REV. 1, 6-9 (1999); see generally Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L.
REv. 477 (1967); Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform
Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829 (1966).
13. Nolan, supra note 12, at 6-9.
14. See Debi McRae, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Best Interests Marital Presumption of
Paternity: It is Actually in the Best Interests of Children to Divorce the Current Application of the Best
Interests Marital Presumption of Paternity, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 345, 360 (2006)
("bastardy laws denied illegitimate children the right to child support and the right to inherit property
from their parents at common law").
15. Nolan, supra note 12, at 7-8. England changed this and gave the illegitimate child a right to
support, as did most states in the United States.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Joseph C. Ayer, Jr., Legitimacy and Marriage, 16 HARV. L. REv. 22, 37 (1902).
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Because of the harsh repercussions of being stigmatized a bastard, the
common law developed the presumption of paternity, in part to protect the
welfare of the child, when the mother of the questionable child was mar-
ried.19 The presumption assumed that a child born in wedlock was legiti-
mate, which "elevated child welfare above adult interests" by making it
almost impossible for a husband to refute his parental status.20 Traditional-
ly, the husband could only rebut the presumption by showing that he could
not have possibly fathered the child because he was either incapable of
procreation or did not have access to his wife during the "relevant pe-
riod." 21 This highly improbable standard is also seen by the courts' early
adherence to Lord Mansfield's rule, which barred the very spousal testimo-
ny that would have been crucial in proving another man's paternity.22 As
historian Michael Grossberg suggests, "[b]y continuing to deny married
couples the most effective means of establishing the illegitimacy of a child,
the courts placed child welfare above parental rights, thus ignoring the
growing conviction of jurists that litigants had the right to present all evi-
dence that supported their causes." 23 In contrast to the growing conviction
of jurists, Professor Theresa Glennon seems to correctly understand that a
traditional basis for the presumption was to indoctrinate the understanding
that "parenthood within marriage best protects children," positioning child
welfare at the forefront of the presumption's rationales. 24
Even after the Supreme Court stripped away many of the vestiges of
bastardy law, 25 making the distinction between illegitimate and legitimate
children less legally important, the courts continued to apply the presump-
tion to protect a child's best interest within the bonds of marriage. 26 The
reasoning implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Michael H. v. Gerald
D. is that a child's best interest is served when that child is capable of sus-
taining a long-term relationship with both parents, cemented through the
child's parents' marriage. 27 In this case, Gerald D. and Carole D. were
19. Appleton, supra note 4, at 243.
20. Id.
21. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1988) (citing H. NICHOLAS, ADULTURINE
BASTARDY 1, 9-10 (1836)).
22. Appleton, supra note 4, at 243.
23. MICHAL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 220 (1985).
24. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption
of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 590-91 (2000).
25. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
26. MichaelH.,491 U.S. at 110.
27. See id at 124.
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married for approximately two years when Carole D. became pregnant. 28
Carole D., however, suspected that the child's biological father was really
her neighbor, Michael H. 29 After the child was born, the presumption of
parenthood was applied, and Gerald D. was placed on the birth certificate
as the child's father since he was married to the child's mother.30 It was
later shown through blood test results that Michael H. was indeed the bio-
logical father, and he subsequently attempted to establish his paternity in
court.3 1 The Supreme Court reaffirmed Gerald D.'s paternity, recognizing
that a legal parent did not necessarily have to be a biological parent, and the
presumption of parenthood could apply even to a non-biological father
when that father was the husband of the child's mother and that father had
a strong parental connection to the child.32 Other courts agreed with the
proposition that the best interest of the child is protected when that child
has two parents, 33 and the presumption was used to ensure that the child
had two parents.34
Although it is clear that a child's welfare was a traditional rationale
underlying the presumption, how exactly is it that a child's welfare is
served by having two legally recognized parents? One way is that when a
child has two legal parents, that child has a greater likelihood of maintain-
ing relationships with both parents if the parents ever divorce, thus continu-
ing the nurturing and emotionally supportive benefits of having both
parental figures.35 Because both parents would have legal claims to visita-
tion and/or custody, and "presum[ing] that parental visitation is in the best
interest of the child, absent proof that such visitation would be harmful,"
the best interest of the child is served when both parents can claim the child
as legally their own. 36 If, for example, the non-biological parent were not
presumed the legal parent of the child created through artificial insemina-
28. Id at 113.
29. Id at 113-14.
30. Seeid.atll3.
31. Id. at 114.
32. Id. at 124-26.
33. See, e.g., C. M. v. C. C., 377 A.2d 821, 825 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977); see also Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) ("We do not question that the best interests of [illegitimate]
children often may require their adoption into new families who will give them the stability of a normal,
two-parent home."); In re A.A., 144 Cal. App. 4th 771, 781 (2003) ("[tjhe paternity presumptions are
driven by state interest in preserving the integrity of the family and legitimate concern for the welfare of
the child").
34. See, e.g. In re JO., 178 Cal. App. 4th 139, 148-49 (2009) (the presumption will not be rebut-
ted when the result will be to leave the child with fewer than two parents because the child should have
the benefit of two parents whenever possible).
35. See In the Matter of Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844, 846 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992).
36. Id.
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tion, and the non-biological parent could not afford to adopt the child at the
time of birth, in most states, the non-biological parent would not have a
right to see that child if the spouses ever divorced.37 This could seriously
affect the well-being of the child by removing a long-time parental rela-
tionship from its life, consequently removing a potent source of emotional
support. Furthermore, scientific evidence suggests that "the presence of two
parents, irrespective of their gender or sexual orientation, [is] associated
with more positive outcomes for [a child's] psychological well-being." 38
Along the same vein, the presumption increases the well-being of children
because children benefit from the simple fact of having a legally recog-
nized relationship with both parents-not a relationship that is extra-legal
and socially stigmatizing.39
In addition to the emotional and psychological aspects, a child with
two legal parents benefits economically. 40 When a child has two parents,
that child has two sources of inheritance, can be eligible through both par-
ents for Social Security benefits in the event of disability or death,41 and
has access to medical benefits provided by either parent's employment and
may be able to choose the more generous plan, depending on the policy's
conditions. 42 The child also has rights concerning survivors' benefits and
military benefits. 43 While not exhaustive, this list illustrates the financial
advantages of having two legal parents and illustrates another manner in
which the presumption is important with respect to a child's welfare.
B. Protecting the Public Purse
Another documented historical rationale for the presumption of pa-
renthood is the benefit that it has on preserving limited governmental re-
37. See id. Under New York law, In the Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y.
1991), and some other jurisdictions, In re the Interest of of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991); Nancy
S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991), the non-biological mother would have no right to visita-
tion even if it were demonstrated that denying visitation would be harmful to the child. While these
cases are discussing adoptions by same-sex couples, the underlying reasoning is substantially similar
and relevant to a discussion concerning legal parentage and the presumption of parenthood.
38. Ellen C. Perrin et al., Gay and Lesbian Issues in Pediatric Health Care, 34 CURRENT PROBS.
IN PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 355, 378-79 (2004).
39. See Evan, 153 Misc. 2d at 847 ("As he matures, his connection with two involved, loving
parents will not be a relationship seen as outside the law, but one sustained by the ongoing, legal recog-
nition of a court-ordered adoption."). Although this is adoption-related, the basic premise remains: a
child who has two legal parents is benefitted because he or she is not stigmatized by having a non-legal
parent.
40. See id. at 846.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2006).
42. See Evan, 153 Misc. 2d at 846.
43. In re J.O., 178 Cal. App. 4th 139, 148-49 (2009).
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sources and taxpayer dollars.44 In sixteenth-century England, in order to
remove the financial burden of illegitimate children, the government man-
dated that children born out of wedlock be cared for by the parish.45 Of
course, the parish did not want to foot the bill for these illicit children, so
when the mother of the bastard child was not married, and no presumption
of paternity was enforceable, Parliament nonetheless attempted to shift the
financial burden of caring for illegitimate children from the parish to the
actual parents by enacting the 1576 Poor Laws in England.46 These laws
granted authority to justices of the peace to collect money or other goods
from the actual parents for the upkeep of the illegitimate child.47 In the
early 1600s, the same notions behind the British Poor Laws made their way
to the colonies. Virginia, for example, recognized that the church was the
legal guardian of the bastard child, but that the church could recoup its
funds by fining the parents for their illicit acts.48 The illegitimate children
of these immoral unions were also forced to compensate the church by
working in flax houses or by being "bound to some manual trade." 49 This
system of after-the-fact compensation when a child was born out of wed-
lock was obviously cumbersome and difficult to enforce. 50 So when the
mother was married at the time of the child's birth, the presumption of
paternity served to save the state and the church the financial burden of
caring for the child first, and seeking compensation from the parents later;
when a child was born to a married couple, the church could wash its hands
of both the costs of childcare and child-support collection. In essence,
"[b]efore the scientific developments that now permit accurate paternity
testing, the presumption definitely identified a legal father responsible for
child support and this man's legal heirs." 51 This financially liberated the
state from being forced to support the fatherless child through welfare pro-
grams, 52 and courts have taken this "public funds" rationale into considera-
44. See Appleton, supra note 4, at 246.
45. Dominik Lasok, Virginia Bastardy Laws: A Burdensome Heritage, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.,
402, 407 (1967). Unlike the United States, England does not have such a definite separation between
church and state. In the 1500s, for example, bishops served in the House of Lords in Parliament. HOUSE
OF LORDS, THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS (2008), available at
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-information-office/hoflbphistory.pdf
46. Lasok, supra note 45, at 407.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 412. Later legislation also provided that if the mother was an unmarried servant, she
would have to pay 2000 pounds of tobacco to her master in addition to being whipped. Id. at 416.
49. Id at 412.
50. See id at 416 ("[I]t was not always possible to exact payment from the putative father espe-
cially if he was a servant.").
51. Appleton, supra note 4, at 247.
5 2. Id.
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tion when deciding paternity. 53 Essentially, this rationale for the presump-
tion recognizes that the two people who participate in the decision to create
a child, and not the state, should be financially responsible for that child.54
C. Biological Concerns
Along with child welfare and state fiscal concerns, scholars recognize
the promotion of biological connections between parent and child as anoth-
er traditional, albeit disputed, justification for the presumption of parent-
hood.55 Since its early formation in England, the presumption of
parenthood could be rebutted by evidence showing that the presumed father
was not actually the natural father of the child. The "conclusive presump-
tion did not apply unless the husband and wife were cohabiting." 56 The
presumption also did not apply if the husband was sterile or "beyond the
four seas" (away from England) for more than nine months, 57 or if the
child's race did not match that of the husband.58 All of these exceptions to
the presumption demonstrate that even before DNA testing, the father's
biological connection to the child related to the traditional common law
presumption of paternity, allowing the father to escape the clutches of the
presumption if he could prove he did not father the child. In fact, some
scholars suggest that the presumption was simply a rudimentary way of
determining genetic relationships in the absence of paternity tests. 59 If a
husband was incapable of passing his genetic material to his wife, either by
not being in contact with her for nine months or by nature of his impotence,
the common law carved out a biology-based exception that allowed the
husband to rebut the presumption. 60 Even today, this biological concern is
53. See Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. 4th 108, 123 (2005) ("By recognizing the value of determin-
ing paternity, the Legislature implicitly recognized the value of having two parents, rather than one, as a
source of both emotional and financial support, especially when the obligation to support the child
would otherwise fall to the public.").
54. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1410, 1424 (1998) ("Very plainly, the
Legislature has declared its preference for assigning individual responsibility for the care and mainten-
ance of children; not leaving the task to the taxpayers.") (emphasis in original).
55. See Appleton, supra note 4, at 251.
56. Id. at 251; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989).
57. Appleton, supra note 4, at 251.
58. Id; see also Jeffries v. Moore, 559 S.E.2d 217, 221 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
59. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Oppor-
tunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 317.
60. Appleton, supra note 4, at 251-52. But see In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (N.Y. 1930) ("If
husband and wife are living together in the conjugal relation, legitimacy will be presumed, though the
wife has harbored an adulterer.").
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alive and well. 61 Some state courts have even held that a father who raises
the child as his own, but is later proven to not be the biological father, can
rebut the presumption and release himself from any legal connection to that
child.62 This shows that in addition to protecting the state's budget and
providing for the child's well-being, at least some states acknowledge that
a crucial underlying reason of the presumption is to recognize and maintain
biological relationships. 63
Some scholars, however, suggest that the biological rationale underly-
ing the presumption might not be exclusively based on the father's legiti-
mate genetic connection to his offspring, but rather on the appearance of
biological ties between parent and child.64 Professor Appleton proposes
that "[i]f a child could 'pass' as the husband's own, then the law made the
husband the father . .. [but] if one could see through the charade, then the
presumption would not apply." 6 5 Professor Appleton recognizes that while
the historical exceptions to the presumption might have implicated genetic
relationships, the real motivation underlying the doctrine was the appear-
ance of a facially cohesive family unit. This conclusion is supported by the
fact that the husband could not introduce rebuttal evidence to discount his
paternity "even if he knew that his wife had strayed" or was aware of his
sterility. 66 If the presumption was necessarily focused on biological ties,
why would the rule allow such near-impossible hurdles to the discovery of
the biological truth? It seems then that these "nuances in the rule signal an
emphasis on the perceptions of others, not biology." 67
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court indicated in Michael H., biological
ties often take a backseat when the other traditional rationales-namely
child welfare-are implicated, showing that genetic relationships might not
61. See e.g., Jeffries, 559 S.E.2d at 221. But see Love v. Love, 959 P.2d 523, 527 & n.2 (Nev.
1998), where even though the mother lied to her husband about him being the biological father, he was
still liable for child support because the traditional rationales of child welfare and preserving public
funds outweighed the concern of genetic ties: the "legislature's primary interest [in creating the pre-
sumption of parenthood] was in ensuring that children are supported by their parents, and not by wel-
fare."
62. See NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178, 180 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (although the husband had as-
sumed the role of father for the child's entire life, he did not knowingly misrepresent to the child that he
was his natural father). But see M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775, 779 (N.J. 1985).
63. But see Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998) ("Thus, the State retains a strong and
direct interest in ensuring that children born of a marriage do not suffer financially or psychologically
merely because of a parent's belated and self-serving concern over a child's biological origins.").
64. See Appleton. supra note 4, at 253.
65. Id Professor Appleton suggests that "the obligation to support a child whom others might
know that the husband had not fathered perhaps would add too much insult to injury." Id.
66. Id. (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 254.
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be genuinely fundamental to the presumption. 68 In that case, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the paternity of a non-biological father who was pre-
sumed the parent of his child because he was married to her mother at the
time of birth, consequently denying the biological father's claim for pater-
nity. Although blood test results proved that the presumed father was not
the biological father, the court decided that the child's interest in maintain-
ing a two-parent family outweighed concerns about biological ties-
seemingly devaluing the importance of genetics as a fundamental justifica-
tion for the presumption. 69 Even if biology played a role in the formation of
the traditional presumption of parenthood, it seems that the other considera-
tions have taken on more weight in determining parentage-at least to the
Supreme Court. In the end, whether supportive of true genetic bonds or
superficially cohesive families, the biological rationale does not factor into
the discussion below concerning lesbian couples and children born through
artificial insemination-limiting the applicability of the biological basis in
this analysis.
II. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF PARENTHOOD
Although the traditional rationales of the presumption of parenthood
apply to fathers of children begotten by sexual intercourse who are married
to the biological mother, these same rationales can be used to make sense
of the presumption as it applies to children conceived through artificial
insemination. In a study conducted by the Congressional Office of Tech-
nology and Assessment (OTA) (the most comprehensive survey to date),
the researchers concluded that between 1986 and 1987, 172,000 women
underwent artificial insemination by anonymous donor ("AID").70 Another
study conducted a few years later estimated that approximately 80,000
women each year undergo AID. 7 ' While no national survey determining
the percentage of lesbian women undergoing AID could be found, one
micro-survey of a California-based artificial insemination clinic showed
that 62% of the surveyed women who utilized AID were lesbian.72 The
68. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-27 (1989).
69. See id.
70. U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY 3(1988); see also Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism
Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor 6 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173, 177-78 (1996).
71. Judith Gaines, A Scandal ofArtificial Insemination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/l990/10/07/magazine/a-scandal-of-artificial-
insemination.html?pagewanted= 1/.
72. Raymond W. Chan, Barbara Raboy & Charlotte J. Patterson, Psychosocial Adjustment Among
Children Conceived via Donor Insemination by Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers, 69 CHILD DEV.,
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evident and growing importance of AID in the creation of lesbian families
requires that the old doctrines regarding legal parentage be reinterpreted to
take into account this modem family, not only for the preservation of the
family unit, but also for the benefit of the children involved. Specifically,
the presumption of parenthood that is automatically given to the non-
biological father of an AID-conceived child should also be afforded to the
non-biological lesbian mother of an AID-conceived child (both non-
biological parents being married to the artificially inseminated wife). Look-
ing at the history of AID, the statutory incorporation of the procedure, and
the application of the presumption's traditional rationales discussed above,
it is evident that the female spouse of the biological mother should have the
right to legal parenthood from birth.
A. The History ofArtificial Insemination
While most people think that artificial insemination is a relatively new
procedure, the process of artificial insemination 73 can actually be traced
back to 220 A.D., 74 with the first reported human case occurring in Eng-
land in 1770.75 In the United States, the first reported artificial insemination
procedure occurred in 1866, but it was met with public outrage, and the
procedure was effectively discontinued for some time.76 The first known
case of AID in the United States was performed in 1884.77 Today, artificial
insemination is a popular and publicly accepted manner of producing child-
ren when a woman's partner cannot provide viable sperm, or when the
mother decides to have her child without a partner.78
443, 445 (1998) (in a pool of 195 families, thirty-four of the families were headed by lesbian couples,
and seventy were headed by a single lesbian parent); see also Carol A. Donovan, The Uniform Paren-
tage Act and Nonmarital Motherhood-By-Choice, II N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 193, 195 (1983).
73. Some commentators prefer the term "alternative insemination" instead of "artificial insemina-
tion." See Vickie L. Henry, A Tale of Three Women: A Survey of the Rights and Responsibilities of
Unmarried Women Who Conceive by Alternative Insemination and a Model for Legislative Reform, 19
AM. J.L. & MED. 285 (1993). Other commentators prefer the use of the phrase "donor insemination."
See Ethics Commission of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations ofAssistedReproduc-
tive Technologies, 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY IS, 43S (Supp. Nov. 1994).
74. Harlow, supra note 70, at 176.
75. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-
Mortem Insemination, I J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234 (1987) (first case performed by surgeon John Hunter).
There is, however, some controversy because some researchers say that the first artificial insemination
was actually performed by a French doctor, not a British doctor, in the 1700s. See WILFRED J.
FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 6 (2d ed. 1976).
76. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 75, at 234. Before this, animals were artificially insemi-
nated. Id.
77. Denise S. Kaiser, Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmar-
riedRecipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 794 (1988).
78. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 75, at 234.
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Even though some courts in the first three quarters of the twentieth
century considered AID tantamount to a wife's adultery, the most modernly
acceptable and "logical evaluation of the legal significance of AID was
made by the Supreme Court of California in 1968."79 In People v. Soren-
sen, the California Court found that a husband who consented to his wife's
impregnation by artificial insemination was that child's legal father, and
therefore had to pay child support.80 The court recognized that without the
husband's "participation and consent," his wife would not have undergone
the procedure. 81 The court realized that in ascertaining legitimacy, "the
determinative factor is whether the legal relationship of father and child
exists," not whether there was any biological connection to an anonymous
donor.82 Since "the anonymous donor of the sperm cannot be considered
the 'natural father,' as he is no more responsible for the use made of his
sperm than is the donor of blood or a kidney," it would make little sense to
"illegitimate" the child by removing the possibility for the child to have a
legal father through the presumption of parenthood. 83 Stated another way,
because the child has no legally recognizable natural father, it would serve
no purpose to bastardize the child by not recognizing the mother's husband
as the legal parent, especially when that husband has consented to, and
readily participated in, the entire procedure.84 Courts ultimately recognized
that "[p]arental status could be created without genetic tie, merely by in-
tending to become a parent." 85
B. Statutory Incorporation of the Artificial Insemination Presumption:
Marriage as a Marker for Parentage
Taking their cue from the common law, most states have enacted sta-
tutory guidelines for artificial insemination. These statutes normally pro-
vide that a man is the legal father of a child conceived through AID if (1)
he and the mother of the child are married; (2) the husband consents to the
procedure; and (3) there has been a substantial effort to disconnect any
legal ties that the sperm donor has to the potential child.86 Inherent in the
79. Id. at 238.
80. People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 498.
83. Id
84. See generally id. at 498-501.
85. Deborah L. Forman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of Gay Mar-
riage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 46 B.C. L. REv 1, 37-38 (2004).
86. See e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405 (2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (LexisNexis
2009); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2010).
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common law and statutory articulation of artificial insemination is that,
while the other traditional reasons for a presumption of parenthood still
hold true (i.e., child welfare and protecting the state purse), the biological
rationale necessarily falls away because there is no genetic connection be-
tween child and legal father. 87 In most of the artificial insemination laws,
the state actually prevents the donor from exerting any parental right to a
child that may be produced from his donated sperm. In fact, many sperm
donation facilities require that the donor sign a release form, removing any
legal claims to the potential child.88 Therefore, the law and practice of AID
necessarily subtract any biological foundations that the presumption may
have had from the equation; the state governments are essentially recogniz-
ing that a biological connection is not a vital factor to the determination of
parental status since the state statutes effectively prevent biology from
playing a role in the determination of legal parenthood. 89 The courts have
also recognized that biology is not determinative of parental status when
children are created by artificial insemination.90 Since biology cannot play
a role in determining parentage by artificial insemination, the traditional
"biological connection" rationale has no weight in this analysis, and only
the public purse and child welfare rationales apply.
Furthermore, even if we accept Professor Appleton's suggestion that
the biological concern was more about the child looking like the parent
rather than the child and parent actually being genetically connected, that
analysis is only applicable to the presumption in traditional childbirth, not
the artificial insemination context. The biological rationale (and the "pass-
ing" rationale, for that matter) exists exclusively through the exceptions to
the presumption, which attempt to disprove paternity by showing that the
presumed father could not have biologically contributed to the creation of
the child. 91 Genetics are relevant only when the biological mother's hus-
87. Appleton, supra note 4, at 252.
88. For example, all donors at the California Cryobank must sign the following waiver: "I have no
intention or desire to be deemed a legal parent of any resulting child(ren) and, to the fullest extent
possible, waive any and all claims that I may have to parenthood or any child(ren) that may result from
my donation(s). I intend for this waiver to apply regardless of whether my semen specimens are used by
a married or unmarried woman and regardless of the state in which my semen specimens are used."
Rights of the Sperm Donor and Clients Purchasing and Using Sperm, CAL. CYROBANK,
http://www.spermbank.com/newdonors/index.cfmID=5 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
89. See e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405 (2009) (donor shall have no right, obligation, or inter-
est with respect to a child bom as a result of artificial insemination); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2010)
(same).
90. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 968 (Vt. 2006) (finding it illogical to
base artificial insemination paternity solely on biology because that would force the non-biological
parent to adopt the child).
91. For example, historically, the husband could show that he was not the father by proving that
he was not in contact with his wife for the relevant period. See Appleton, supra note 4, at 251.
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band's status as the child's father is being rebutted because even if the pre-
sumed father is not the biological father, without a challenge to that pre-
sumption, biology plays no role in the legal status of that father-child
relationship. 92 While couples who use artificial insemination can try and
match the appearance of the anonymous donor with that of the legal father,
in the event that the child does not look like the mother's husband, the hus-
band cannot "rebut" the presumption of parenthood by showing that he is
not the biological father because that is a given with AID. Even though the
original presumption may have been rooted in the appearance of a geneti-
cally related family by nature of the father's ability to renounce paternity if
his child did not look like him (and was subsequently found to not be his
offspring), this justification is not relevant to the artificial insemination
presumption because the AID-created child is by definition not the father's
offspring, and therefore, appearances have no consequence. Essentially, the
"risk" of having a non-passing child is shifted to the father, and he cannot
renounce paternity after he has consented to the AID procedure. As stated
above, the father has, by statute, given away his ability to rebut the pre-
sumption when he agrees to his wife's impregnation through AID, which
necessarily excludes his ability to rebut his paternity in the event that his
child does not look like his own.
What is therefore apparent about the presumption of parenthood with
respect to artificial insemination is that it arises purely out of the marriage
(and consent) of two people-not any biological relationships to the
child. 93 When a husband consents to his wife's use of artificial insemina-
tion as a means to create a child, the law does not require anything of the
husband besides proof of his marriage to his wife and, sometimes, that his
consent be in writing. 94 Since artificial insemination laws require that the
parties be married before the non-biological parent is legally presumed,95
but do not (and by definition cannot) require any biological ties to the
child, it follows that marriage is essentially the only prerequisite to obtain-
92. Without a paternity challenge, the legal relationship between father and child remains intact
even though the biological relationship between them might not exist.
93. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2009) ("A child, born to a married woman by means of
artificial insemination performed by a licensed physician and consented to in writing by both spouses, is
considered for all purposes the natural and legitimate child of both spouses.") (emphasis added); ARK.
CODE. ANN. § 9-10-201 (2010) ("Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemina-
tion shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman and the woman's husband if the husband
consents in writing to the artificial insemination.") (emphasis added); CAL. FAM, CODE § 7613 (Deering
2009) ("If ... with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially .... the husband is
treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.") (emphasis added).
94. See statutes cited supra note 86.
95. For example, for the non-biological parent to be placed on the birth certificate at the time of
birth.
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ing the presumption in artificial insemination situations. This is important
to the topic of artificial insemination in lesbian relationships because it is
only when two women are married 96 that the artificial insemination pre-
sumption can apply.97 Furthermore, even though the artificial insemination
statutes are normally opposite-sex specific, 98 some courts read the statutes
to include same-sex couples. 99 Also, since the statutes themselves require
no other relationship besides marriage of the parties involved, lesbian mar-
ried couples should be covered by the same statutory presumption by na-
ture of their marital status.100
C. Applying the Artificial Insemination Presumption to a Non-Biological
Mother: The Traditional Rationales Revisited 0 1
A married lesbian couple should, solely by nature of their marriage, be
able to invoke the artificial insemination presumption of parenthood as it is
written in several state laws. Yet, since most of the statutes regarding AID
parentage are specific to heterosexual couples, some extra motivation will
undoubtedly be required in order to persuade a court to expand the literal
meaning of the text to include lesbian married couples. This motivation
could arise from the application of the traditional purposes of the presump-
tion of parenthood discussed in Part I. Again, the traditional rationales jus-
tifying the creation of the presumption were for the welfare of the child, the
protection of public funds, and, to some degree, the preservation of biolog-
ical ties to both parents. With artificial insemination by an anonymous do-
nor, however, the biological rationale disappears because from the get-go,
there is no biological connection between the child and the parent seeking
the benefit of the presumption of parenthood. Therefore, to bolster the
96. But see Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. 4th 108 (2005) (finding that the women's civil union
was essentially the same thing as marriage for purposes of the artificial insemination presumption).
97. See statutes cited supra note 86. In most artificial insemination statutes, the marriage of the
two parents is the underlying requirement to obtaining legal parenthood for the non-biological parent.
98. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Elisa B., 37 Cal. 4th 108. But see In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 311-
12 (111. App. Ct. 2005) (reading artificial insemination presumption of parenthood narrowly to apply
only to married men and women).
100. This is merely a bare-bones statutory reading, and the argument to allow lesbian married
couples to utilize the presumption of parenthood needs to be supplemented by the presumption's tradi-
tional justifications. Since the statutes are opposite-gender specific, it seems that many courts will not
expand them to include same-sex couples unless the public policy espoused by the presumption statutes
also supports affording the presumption to lesbian married couples. This is the rationale underlying the
application of the traditional justifications to lesbian artificial insemination in the remainder of this
Note.
101. This Note will not address the situation where one mother donates her egg and the other
mother carries that egg and subsequent child. For that analysis, see Ryiah Lilith, The G.IF.T of Two
Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 207 (2001).
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claim that the lesbian spouse of the artificially inseminated biological
mother should be afforded the presumption of parenthood, an application of
the child welfare and state financial justifications should be applied to the
current realities of artificial insemination in lesbian marriages.
1. A child's welfare is served by legally recognizing lesbian parents.
As noted above, one of the traditional rationales for the presumption
was to promote the well-being of the child by automatically giving that
child two parents who have a legally recognized level of commitment to
each other within the bonds of marriage. The benefits afforded a child bom
with two legal parents range from financial support to emotional support,
and securing this welfare for children from the moment they are born is an
essential element in sustaining the best interests of children. Without a
gender-blind (or sexual-orientation-blind) presumption, the lesbian spouse
who becomes pregnant by an anonymous donor is the only legal parent to
that child, depriving the child of having two legal parents, even though the
non-biological spouse is ready, willing, and able to care for and support
that child. From a child welfare point of view, the only reason to deny the
presumption to same-sex lesbian couples would be because of some delete-
rious effect on the child's well-being by having two mothers instead of a
mother and father. Credible social science research demonstrates that there
is no difference between same-sex and different-sex parents in terms of the
welfare of the child being raised. Therefore, with respect to the traditional
rationale of child welfare, there is no reason not to afford the presumption
to a lesbian non-biological mother.
Lesbians can and do form the same type of committed relationships as
heterosexual couples. Therefore, any stereotypical arguments that same-sex
married couples should not be granted the presumption by nature of some
substantial difference stemming from the same-sex relationships them-
selves are absurd. Although research on the relationship qualities of mar-
ried same-sex couples is still developing by nature of its "newness," it is
still possible to get a feel for the equality between same-sex and different-
sex relationships by examining research discussing same-sex relationships
in general. In her expert affidavit for the plaintiffs in Varnum v. Brien, Dr.
Pepper Schwartz emphasized that "lesbians form stable, committed rela-
tionships that are equivalent to heterosexual relationships." 02 She also
noted that homosexual couples are no more vulnerable to relationship prob-
102. Affidavit of Pepper Schwartz at 3, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (No.
CV5965).
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lems than are heterosexual couples.103 The American Psychological Asso-
ciation urges that, after extensive research regarding same-sex and differ-
ent-sex couples, the psychological data "provides no evidence to justify
discrimination against same-sex couples." 104 All of this research leads to
one conclusion: that there is no functional or fundamental difference
beyond gender composition, psychological or otherwise, that generally
differentiates same-sex from different-sex relationships. Because empirical
research shows that lesbians do form the same sort of relationships as do
heterosexual couples, one cannot justify the exclusion of non-biological
lesbian mothers from the benefits of the presumption by nature of stereo-
typical arguments that homosexual relationships are somehow "inferior" to,
or "substantially different" from, heterosexual relationships.
Similar research shows that same-sex couples make just as good par-
ents as their opposite-sex counterparts, and researchers have concluded that
heterosexual and lesbian parents do not differ in their parenting ability. 05
In fact, Dr. Michael Lamb concludes that children raised by gay and les-
bian couples are as likely to be well-adjusted as those children raised by
heterosexual couples, and it is actually the emotional relationship to the
parent, as well as economic resources, that are the most contributory factors
to a well-adjusted parent-child relationship.106 Dr. Lamb notes that "child-
ren's adjustment is not affected by the gender or sexual orientation of the
parent(s)," and "[t]he children of same-sex parents are as emotionally
healthy and as educationally and socially successful as children raised by
heterosexual parents." 07 Dr. Lamb also finds that "[t]here is no empirical
support in the social science literature for the claim that there is an optimal
gender mix of parents or that children with two female . . . parents suffer
any developmental disadvantages relative to children with two different-
sex parents." 08 Moreover, the American Psychological Association recog-
nizes that "[r]esearch has shown that adjustment, development, and psycho-
logical well-being of children is unrelated to parental sexual orientation and
103. Id. at 3; see also Lawrence A. Kurdek, Are Gay and Lesbian Cohabiting Couples Really
Different from Heterosexual Married Couples?, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 880 (2004) (finding no differ-
ences between gay and lesbian couples and heterosexual couples without children on individual perso-
nality differences, views on relationships, conflict resolution, and satisfaction).
104. AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, RESOLUTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND MARRIAGE (2004),
available at http://www.apa.org/about/govemance /council/policy/gay-marriage.pdf.
105. Affidavit of Michael E. Lamb at 3, Varnuni v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (No.
CV5965); see also Susan Golombok et al., Children with Lesbian Parents: A Community Study, 39
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 20, 29 (2003); Cheryl A. Parks, Lesbian Parenthood: A Review of the
Literature, 68 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 376,381-84 (1998).
106. Affidavit of Michael E. Lamb, supra note 105, at 4.
107. Id. at 7.
108. Id.
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that the children of lesbian and gay parents are as likely as those of hetero-
sexual parents to flourish." 09
Children with lesbian mothers may actually benefit from their non-
traditional families. Some studies of children with gay or lesbian parents
have reported that "like the children in other types of nontraditional fami-
lies, these children have less sex-stereotyped beliefs, and are more open-
minded."o10 This sometimes stems from the less gendered division of labor
in same-sex households, giving children of same-sex couples a more egali-
tarian model of work and family life. 111 This line of research shows that
children of lesbian mothers are actually benefited by having a nontradition-
al family because they are more open to new careers than those stereotypi-
cally restricted to certain gender-roles.1 12 Furthermore, some studies show
that in contrast with children of heterosexual parents, "children with lesbian
parents are more likely to feel loveable and to be protective with younger
children, and less likely to be bossy and domineering."ll 3
Some authority, however, points the other way-attempting to show
that same-sex parents are not as adequate as opposite-sex parents. For ex-
ample, the President of the National Association for Research & Therapy
of Homosexuality,"l 4 Dr. A. Dean Byrd, suggests that children need a
mother and a father because children need to witness dual-gendered inte-
ractions at home in order to be emotionally stable in the future.1 15 Dr. Byrd
cites several studies from the eighties and early nineties, which suggest that
children need the "warm and sympathetic" parenting style of a mother, as
well as the "consistent and predictable" style of a father, in order to flou-
rish. 116 Furthermore, Dr. Bryd recognizes the "complementary" nature of a
109. AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, supra note 104; see also Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian
and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEv., 1025, 1036 (1992) ("There is no evidence to suggest that psychoso-
cial development among children of gay men or lesbians is compromised in any respect relative to that
among offspring of heterosexual parents.").
110. Affidavit of Michael E. Lamb, supra note 105, at 8.
111. ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: RESEARCH ON THE
FAMILY LIFE CYCLE 99-100 (2010).
112. Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?,
66 AM. Soc. REv. 159, 168 (2001). For example, a daughter of a lesbian couple is more likely to think
that being an astronaut or being a doctor are appropriate'aspirations for girls as well as boys than are
girls raised by heterosexual mothers. Id. Likewise, the children of lesbian mothers may tend to think of
nursing as a possible occupation for both boys and girls.
113. Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social
Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 202 (1995).
114. This organization believes that homosexuality can be "cured" through psychology and reli-
gion.
115. Dr. Byrd Provides Testimony in English Court Case Regarding Same-Sex Adoption, NAT'L
Ass'N FOR RESEARCH & THERAPY OF HOMOSEXUALITY (Feb. 1, 2007),
http://www.narth.com/docs/byrdtestimony.pdf.
116. Id.16.
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mother's and a father's roles in childrearing, whereby the mother's touch is
used to "calm" and "soothe," whereas the father is "less involved in care-
taking" and more involved in "rough and tumble play."I1 7 These differenc-
es, along with the fact that fathers are "firm" when it comes to discipline
and mothers tend to "negotiate" with children, make up a substantial basis
for why Dr. Byrd believes that same-sex parents are incapable of maintain-
ing an optimal rearing environment. If it is not obvious already, these ar-
guments are not only outdated, but also seem to be based on the very
gender stereotypes about men and women that our society no longer sup-
ports.1 8 In fact, while it may go without saying that being "firm" or being
"calm" are not sex-specific characteristics, Dr. Byrd's analysis does not
ever conclude that a same-sex couple cannot embody these "complementa-
ry" parenting styles. The only "negative" he posits about same-sex couples
rearing children is that these children are less constrained by gender
norms.119 He claims that boys raised by lesbians are "less traditionally
masculine" and girls raised by lesbians are "more sexually adventurous and
less chaste."' 20 Without an explanation of what being "less traditionally
masculine" means, or why that is a negative, it seems difficult to conclude
that same-sex parents are deficient because of this claimed effect on young
boys. Furthermore, concluding that daughters of lesbian parents are "less
chaste" seems too explicitly sexist to even warrant rebuttal, especially
when there was no mention of how a boy's sexuality was affected by hav-
ing lesbian mothers. Overall, the majority of research attempting to suggest
that same-sex parents are incapable of properly rearing children is funda-
mentally based on aged stereotypes about men, women, and marriage.
These studies are not only decades old, but are also incompatible with the
modem breakdown of rigid and sexist gender norms.
Courts have also attempted to rebut the modem science in favor of
same-sex families. In Hernandez v. Robles, for example, the court shee-
pishly recognized that while social science might tend to negate differentia-
tions between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, a "[1]egislature could
rationally think otherwise." 21 In Varnum, the court also recognized that it
117. Id.
118. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
119. See Dr. Byrd Provides Testimony in English Court Case Regarding Same-Sex Adoption, supra
note 115, at 27.
120. Id.
121. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). The court seemed to recognize that the
differentiation between opposite-sex and same-sex couples regarding parenting ability was not
grounded in science, but chose to give no teeth to rational basis review-using it more like an idiocy
test rather than a barrier to discrimination.
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could be rational to think that opposite-sex couples raised children better,
but the court ultimately determined that "[t]hese opinions, while thoughtful
and sincere, were largely unsupported by reliable scientific studies."122 The
Varnum court asserted that science, not stereotypes, should prevail-
recognizing that while some social science and opinion may say the oppo-
site, the majority of credible science does not support the differentiation
between same-sex and opposite-sex parents.
Again, the majority of scientific evidence on the issue concludes that a
child's well-being is not in any way negatively affected by that child hav-
ing two mothers. Children born to lesbian parents can still obtain the emo-
tional and financial benefits of having two parents, such as inheritance
rights and visitation rights in the event of divorce, which are essential to the
well-being rationale of the traditional presumption. If the traditional ratio-
nale of child welfare is used to support the granting of the presumption of
parenthood, the social science research illustrates that that purpose is still
served by lesbian parents.
In fact, if the presumption were not afforded lesbian parents, there is
evidence that a child's well-being would be harmed. Research suggests that
growing up in a single-parent household can actually harm a child's well-
being, and while granting the non-biological mother legal parental status
from birth does not ensure that she will remain married to the biological
mother and therefore remain living with the child, legal parentage presumes
that the non-biological mother will at least have the right to a level of cus-
tody, visitation, and responsibility to support the child. This research extra-
polates the benefits of having two married parents and implicitly explains
how denying a child two legal parents from birth can actually diminish a
child's welfare. Some research suggests that children of single mothers (not
necessarily lesbian) do worse in school and have a lower chance of attend-
ing college than children with two married parents. 123 This same research
suggests that children raised in single-parent families are more likely to
engage in criminal and delinquent behavior, and even have more health
problems later in life.124 While these conclusions are not universally ac-
122. Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899 (Iowa 2009).
123. STEVEN L. NOCK & CHRISTOPHER J. EINOLF, THE ONE HUNDRED BILLION DOLLAR MAN: THE
ANNUAL PUBLIC COSTS OF FATHER ABSENCE 7 (2008).
124. Id.; see also Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Single-Parent Families Are Harmful, in SINGLE-
PARENT FAMILIES 11 (Bruno Leone et al. eds., 1997) (children raised by single parents are two to three
times more likely to have emotional and behavioral problems than children raised in two-parent fami-
lies, and are more likely to abuse drugs, get into trouble with the law, drop out of high school, and get
pregnant as teenagers).
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cepted,125 the fact that some research suggests a corollary between single-
parentage and diminished child well-being reinforces the need to afford the
presumption to lesbian married couples and allow their children the advan-
tage of being born with two parents. The mere chance that not having two
parents can negatively affect a child should weigh in favor of presuming a
lesbian non-biological mother. Why allow the possibility of reducing a
child's well-being by removing a parent when that parent is willing and
able to assume the parental role?
Since research shows that same-sex couples have the same capacity to
raise a child and promote that child's welfare as do heterosexual married
couples, it follows that the same child-welfare rationale motivating the
presumption of parenthood in heterosexual artificially inseminated couples
should apply to homosexual artificially inseminated couples. The social
science negates any reason for a differing application of the presumption,
especially when the best interest of the child is considered a principal justi-
fication of the presumption. If the welfare of the child is served equally by
two lesbian parents as it is with two heterosexual parents, and a child's
welfare is a dominant purpose in applying the presumption in the first
place, it is wrong to deny a child the right to have two parents by not allow-
ing his or her other mother to be presumed a parent.126 Regardless of the
parents' gender and sexual orientation, a child's welfare is benefited mone-
tarily, psychologically, physically, and emotionally by having two parents.
Accordingly, the presumption that automatically creates two parents should
also apply to same-sex married couples in order to benefit the children born
into those unions.
2. The Economic Benefit to the State of Applying the Presumption to
Lesbian Married Couples
Apart from the child's well-being, the other applicable traditional ra-
tionale underlying the presumption of parenthood is the economic benefit
to the state achieved when a second parent is automatically recognized
through the presumption. Since most states do not grant the non-biological
mother legal ties to the child absent a second-parent adoption, she can theo-
retically leave her children if she divorces her wife and have no duty to pay
125. Affidavit of Michael E. Lamb, supra note 105, at 6 (about 70% of children who grow up in
single-parent families are not maladjusted).
126. Some critics argue that these non-biological mothers can adopt these children and become
their parents that way. Yet, adoption is expensive and intrusive, and many parents cannot afford to
spend several thousand dollars to go through the process. Furthermore, a non-biological father of an
AID-created child is not required to adopt his child, so why should a non-biological mother be required
to do so?
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child support or help the biological mother in any way.127 Because the non-
biological mother has no legal obligation to care for the children, the bio-
logical mother is now left alone to support the family, and often, this finan-
cial burden ultimately rests on the government. First, there are direct costs
to the state and federal governments resulting from single-mother house-
holds. In 1986, for example, "[r]oughly one of two single mothers [lived]
below the poverty line, as compared with one in ten married couples with
children."l 28 A more recent study conducted in 2003 concluded that
"39.3 percent of single-mother families [not necessarily lesbian] lived in
poverty."' 29 Since these single-mother households are making less money
than married households, they are paying less taxes, and the state is there-
fore losing out on income.130 Not only is the state receiving less money
from single mothers on average, but these poverty-stricken single-parent
households actually cost the federal government an astounding $99.8 bil-
lion in direct costs-stemming from their dependence on federal welfare
programs.131 In the study, the researchers analyzed fourteen federal pro-
grams and isolated the monetary allocations and program-usage statistics
accounting for single-mother households.132 For example, single-mother
households accounted for one quarter of the total food stamp budget, or
$9.3 billion, and 37% of the households using public housing and Section 8
rental assistance were single-mother households. 133 Of course, creating a
legal bond between the non-biological mother and child would not com-
pletely remove the costs of single-motherhood from the government, but
requiring the non-biological mother to pay some sort of child support in the
event of separation would guarantee that there is less of a burden on the
state-keeping in line with the protection of the public purse rationale.
In addition to the direct and measurable financial costs associated with
impoverished single-mother households, there are indirect costs that are
also statistically attributable to single-mother homes. Unfortunately, the
harsh reality is that children born without two active parents are more like-
127. See, e.g., Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d I (Del. 2009) (former lesbian partner was not considered
a legal parent); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008) (same).
128. Sara McLanahan & Karen Booth, Mother-Only Families: Problems, Prospects, and Politics,
51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557, 558 (1989). This study analyzes all single-mother families, without
differentiating between lesbian and heterosexual single-mothers.
129. Nock & Einolf, supra note 123, at 6.
130. Id. at 8.
131. See id. at lL.
132. Id. at 14-16.
133. Id at 15-16; see also Daniel P. Mueller & Philip W. Cooper, Children of Single Parent Fami-
lies: How They Fare As Young Adults, 35 FAM. RELATIONS 169, 173 (1986) (single-parent families
were more likely to have received welfare assistance than two-parent families).
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ly to be placed in jail, depend on the state for economic support, and have a
more difficult time being productive citizens. 134 Children raised by single
mothers also use mental health services at a higher rate than children from
two-parent families, have more behavioral problems at school, and are
more likely to enter the juvenile system.135 These children are also statisti-
cally more likely to have less education and lower wages than children
from two-parent families, which results in lower tax revenues for the gov-
ernment. 136 While these indirect costs to the government are difficult to
tabulate, some studies indicate how great the cost may in fact be. For ex-
ample, as noted above, children of single-mother households are more like-
ly than children of two-parent homes to go to juvenile detention
programs.137 In New York, the cost of maintaining one juvenile in the de-
tention center for one year in 2009 was $226,320.138 To put that into pers-
pective, the state spends only $15,371 to send a child to a New York City
public high school. 139 This enormous cost shows how financially burden-
some children raised by single mothers can potentially be to the state. 140
All of the statistical analysis relating the associated costs of single-
mother households demonstrates that there is a real risk of unnecessarily
wasting government funds when the presumption of parenthood is not giv-
en to lesbian mothers.141 The risk derives from the fact that the non-
biological mother can theoretically divorce the biological mother and not
have any fiscal obligations to the children due to the nonexistent legal rela-
tionship between her and the children.142 These children are consequently
being raised by a single mother, and the statistics above illustrate the detri-
mental effects on government budgets that such a situation can impose.
134. See Nock & Einolf, supra note 123, at 8, 15-16.
135. Id. at 8.
136. Id.
137. Id
138. CORRECTIONAL Ass'N OF N.Y., JUVENILE DETENTION IN NEW YORK CITY 1 (2010), available
at
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publications/download/jjp/factsheets/detention-fact-sheet2010
.pdf.
139. Id.
140. 1 personally do not endorse this point of view, but am only relating the research to support the
overall analysis.
141. It seems logical, from a fiscal standpoint, to create a legal relationship between the non-
biological mother and the child when that mother actually wants to be legally responsible, and not
attempting to extract financial support from her after a divorce, for example, when she is no longer
willing to foot the bill and the state must go through the expensive court system.
142. See cases cited supra note 127. In those states that do not recognize defacto parenthood, it is
very difficult for the non-biological mother to be considered a legal parent.
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If the presumption of parenthood were to apply to the non-biological
mother by nature of her marriage to the children's biological mother and
her consent to AID, she would automatically have a legal relationship with
her kids and could not simply walk away and leave the state to carry her
burden. The legal parental relationship would create some type of financial
duty to support the children, allowing the state to minimize its costs-at the
very least in terms of the direct costs associated with single mothers.143 As
a presumed parent from birth, the non-biological mother is financially re-
sponsible for her child until it becomes an adult, and that saves the state
money-which is always a persuasive argument. While this rationale might
not be the most altruistic, protecting the public purse was a rationale asso-
ciated with the original presumption of parenthood, and such a rationale
undoubtedly holds true with respect to artificial insemination and lesbian
mothers.
CONCLUSION
The presumption of parenthood is a legal tool, which, at its core, is
used to solidify two legal parents from the moment a child is born. This
doctrine has inevitably been applied in new ways throughout the centuries,
but some of the underlying rationales for the creation and preservation of
the presumption do not seem to have changed-at least in principle. Scho-
lars predominantly identify three motivations when tracing the justifica-
tions for both the old and the new applications of the presumption of paren-
parentage: (1) promotion of child welfare; (2) preservation of public funds;
and to some extent, (3) protection of biological connections. While these
rationales stem from the traditional presumption of parenthood, which of
course emerges from the practice of having children through sexual inter-
course, the advent of artificial insemination by anonymous donor has rede-
fined the presumption and forced it to be applied in new ways. Specifically,
when a lesbian married couple decides to start a family with the help of
AID, the presumption of parenthood should apply to automatically make
the non-biological mother a legal parent by nature of her marriage to the
biological mother and her consent to the child's creation-as it does for
heterosexual couples in the same situation. However, many states have now
143. In Illinois, for example, if the non-biological mother had a legal relationship with the children
by nature of the presumption of parenthood, the non-biological mother will have to pay child support
even if she is not the custodial parent. In the event she does not pay, the state can garnish her wages or
even seize her bank accounts, among other things, in order to protect the state from footing the bill. See
ILLNOIS CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, www.childsupportillinois.com/customers/faq.html (last visited
Nov. 4, 2010).
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codified the presumption of parenthood with regard to artificial insemina-
tion for opposite-sex couples, which actually poses problems for same-sex
married couples who opt for AID and have both of their names on the birth
certificate. This is because the artificial insemination statutes are written in
heterosexual-specific language (before same-sex marriage was legal in any
state), and many courts will not expand the use of the statute beyond the
literal gendered terms. In order to persuade courts to expand the artificial
insemination presumption of parenthood, or at least add to the argument, it
is necessary to recognize how the traditional rationales underlying the his-
torical presumption actually apply in the modem usage of the doctrine.
First, it is necessary to dispel the biology rationale from the beginning
because, by definition, the biological mother's spouse will not be genetical-
ly related to a child born by AID-and that is true for both same-sex and
opposite-sex spouses. It would therefore make little sense to promote ge-
netic ties to children when such ties are impossible to obtain. That leaves
the child welfare and the public purse justifications, which both lean in
favor of affording same-sex married couples the protections and benefits of
the presumption of parenthood. In terms of child welfare, a child is benefit-
ted in several ways by having two parents, and affording the presumption
to lesbian couples would, at the very least, give an added assurance of a
two-parent household from the outset of the child's life. Furthermore, re-
search shows that same-sex parents are just as capable at raising children as
opposite-sex couples, and those children are just as likely to "flourish" as
are children raised by heterosexual couples-which means that the benefit
of having two parents is served by both same-sex and opposite-sex couples
alike. With respect to public funds, by not granting the presumption to les-
bian married couples, the state may suffer. This is because the non-
biological mother has no legal connection to her children, and in the event
of divorce, she can discard any financial obligation without legal ramifica-
tion-leaving it to the state to support the single mother if necessary. Since
single mothers have a higher than average rate of needing governmental
support, by not making the non-biological mother a legal parent from the
outset, the government (i.e., taxpayer) pays.
The traditional rationales underlying the presumption of parenthood
favor granting the presumption to families headed by lesbian married
couples, and there is no legitimate reason for denying this privilege to
them. While the statutes that codify the artificial insemination presumption
are written with "traditional" marital norms in mind, these norms are out-
dated with regard to modern marriage law in states that support same-sex
marriage. At the end of the day, children are generally better off when they
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have two parents-and that is true regardless of the parents' sex or sexual
orientation. So ultimately, do we really want to force good parents, who
love and care for their children, to unnecessarily battle with the uncertain-
ties, costs, and pressures of adoption, just to have a legal relationship with
the children with whom they already have a parental relationship? This
Note has answered that in the negative.

